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Background: We review procurement and pricing transparency practices for pharmaceutical products. We specifically
focus on Brazil and examine its approach to increasing pricing transparency, with the aim of determining the level of
effectiveness in lower prices using a tool (Banco de Preços em Saúde, BPS) that only reveals purchase prices as
compared to other tools (in other countries) that establish a greater degree of price transparency.
Methods: A general report of Preços em Saúde (BPS) and Sistema Integrado de Administração de Serviços Gerais (SIASG)
pricing data was created for 25 drugs that met specific criteria. To explore the linear time trend of each of the drugs,
separate regression models were fitted for each drug, resulting in a total of 19 models. Each model controlled for the state
variable and the interaction between state and time, in order to accommodate expected heterogeneity in the data.
Additionally, the models controlled for procurement quantities and the effect they have on the unit price. Secondary
analysis using mixed effects models was also carried out to account for the impact that institutions and suppliers may have
upon the unit price. Adjusting for these predictor variables (procurement quantities, supplier, purchasing institution) was
important to determine the sole effect that time has had on unit prices. A total of 2 x 19 = 38 models were estimated to
explore the overall effect of time on changes in unit price. All statistical analyses were performed using the R statistical
software, while the linear mixed effects models were fitted using the lme4 R package.
Results: The findings from our analysis suggest that there is no pattern of consistent price decreases within the two
Brazilian states during the five-year period for which the prices were analyzed.
Conclusions: While the BPS does allow for an increase in transparency and information on drug purchase prices in Brazil, it
has not shown to lead to consistent reductions in drug purchase prices for some of the most widely used medicines. This is
indicative of a limited model for addressing the challenges in pharmaceutical procurement and puts into question the
value of tools used globally to improve transparency in pharmaceutical pricing.
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Medicine pricesBackground
Good governance is recognized as an instrumental compo-
nent of healthy health systems [1, 2]. Improving good gov-
ernance can ideally reduce the likelihood of corruption. We
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/effective and efficient, follows the rule of law and is partici-
patory [3]. In theory, supporting good governance should
make any system less vulnerable to corruption. Despite the
growing recognition of the importance of good governance,
corruption continues to be reported in national and global
health systems across a range of environments and has
undermined progress in health services delivery and system
strengthening at a time when investments in global health
interventions has never been higher [4, 5]. Health-related
corruption occurs in both the private and public sphere in
high-income countries, developed country settings, and inticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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is an area where corruption is always a threat [6]. This in-
cludes collusion in bidding, “fixed” procurement bidding
and kickbacks to public officials in order to gain support
for a bid [6]. In order to undercut the threat of corruption
in procurement, particularly in pharmaceutical procure-
ment practices, governments across the globe are turning
to good governance measures such as drug pricing trans-
parency. However, whether pricing transparency actually
leads to positive outcomes, such as lower drug prices still
remains.
Our paper thus examines whether in fact increased
transparency in drug procurement prices actually results
in any discernible difference in drug prices and with that,
ideally, improving access to medicines. We focus our paper
on Brazil and examine its approach to increasing pricing
transparency. More specifically, we aim to examine if
pricing transparency leads to lower drug prices over
time. We justify our choice of Brazil’s federal public insti-
tutions and its suppliers because at the federal level,
reporting procurement pricing information is mandatory.
Thus, we were able to extract such drug pricing informa-
tion from a governmental online database to conduct an
analysis on the effect that pricing transparency has had on
drug purchase prices in two Brazilian states over a five-
year period. We set out to answer the following specific
questions: What does the BPS database show with regards
to drug prices over time? What does the database illumin-
ate with regards to drug prices in two socioeconomically
different Brazilian states? Is the BPS an effective transpar-
ency tool to decrease drug prices?
In recognition of the challenges that are present within
pharmaceutical procurement due to the potential for
pricing distortions, the analysis was structured to ad-
dress and control for procurement quantities (economies
of scale), and supplier and institution/purchaser (poten-
tial sources of corruption). As we noted above, drug pro-
curement is often a common site for corruption, further
exacerbating inequities in access to medicines amongst
the population if, for example, drugs procured have
prices that are out of reach. It is well known that when
corruption is present, it diverts critical government re-
sources from health services and products, which usually
has the largest negative impact on the poor and margin-
alized. Each year, over US$ 4.1 trillion is spent world-
wide on providing health services [7]; but a significant
amount of this money is wasted due to corruption. In
the area of procurement alone, it is estimated that be-
tween 10 % and 25 % of global spending on public pro-
curement is lost to corruption [8].
The primary focus of our paper is to investigate the
impact, if any, of pricing transparency on pharmaceutical
price trends in two states in Brazil – Paraiba and São
Paulo. These states have starkly different socioeconomicconditions, representing states on either end of the so-
cioeconomic spectrum. As is noted later in the paper,
the burden of spending on medicines is most significant
for the poorest of Brazil’s population. We therefore
sought to see if pricing transparency has had any impact
on alleviating this and whether it helps establish equity
among the population. In our analyses the state of Paraiba
represents the poorest of Brazil’s population, and São
Paulo the richest. We propose that Brazil’s approach to
lowering drug prices through the BPS is limited. We
hypothesize that it does not fully address all sources of
possible corruption and inefficiency, nor does it provide
enough incentive for pharmaceutical suppliers to compete
with lower prices. Examples of alternative pricing procure-
ment models are provided in multi-country case studies
later in the report.
Access to medicines and Brazil
In Brazil, access to health services and essential medi-
cines has been a recognized constitutional right since
1988. The country’s publicly-funded universal health sys-
tem, Sistema Unico de Saude (SUS) covers all members
of the population. In addition to public hospitals and
clinics, SUS oversees the distribution of publicly funded
medicines that are listed on Brazil’s Essential Medicines
List (EML), as well as medicines for rare diseases and
those affecting small groups (e.g. anti-retroviral drugs
for HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B and C) [9]. Very few of Brazil’s
private health plans offer medication coverage, so there
are many privately insured people who still rely on SUS
for medicines [10].
While SUS is committed to ensuring equitable access
to medicines, disparities still exist. The burden of spend-
ing on medicines, not surprisingly, is most significant for
the poorest of Brazil’s population. Households belonging
to the lowest income quintile still pay out-of-pocket for
nearly one quarter of their drug purchases [11]. In
2008–2009, the proportion of out-of-pocket spending on
medications in relation to family income was highest for
families in the bottom decile – approximately three
times higher than those in the top decile [12].
Demographic changes as well as persistent inefficien-
cies throughout the pharmaceutical supply chain have
been major burdens on the government and have had
significant impacts on the availability and accessibility of
drugs for the country’s population [10, 11]. In addition
to out-of-pocket spending burdens, 40 % of medicines
that are prescribed in public health care settings are not
readily available in pharmacies due to low resources and
high costs [10, 11].
Pharmaceuticals typically account for about 10 to 30 %
of health budgets in low-income countries [13], so the
appeal of finding effective ways to push down prices is ob-
vious. A well-tried approach is to improve transparency in
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traction globally as a method to help reduce pharma-
ceutical expenditures. In recent years, global initiatives
such as the Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA)
and international organizations such as the World
Health Organization have led efforts to make informa-
tion on price, quality, availability and promotion of medi-
cines publicly available [14]. As a result, there has been a
growth in the creation of databases that make purchasing
information of medicines and other medical products
publicly available on the Internet. Such public intelligence
can, ideally, reveal any potential areas of abuse in pricing,
avoid price variations caused by inefficiencies, and elimin-
ate price differences caused by asymmetrical information
among medicine suppliers and purchasers [15].
Pharmaceutical Procurement: creating a more
competitive market
Most medicines are not sold in competitive commodity
markets. The pharmaceutical market is oligopolistic with
few competitors (producers and suppliers) who are able
to drive up prices given the informational asymmetry
that exists between themselves and their purchasers.
Perfect competition does not exist when it is the pro-
ducers and suppliers that have the greatest influence and
market power to determine the prices of their products.
The consumer typically has little leverage over driving
prices down, particularly on products that are essential
for health and well-being such as pharmaceuticals.
Still, as major purchasers of pharmaceuticals, govern-
ments have introduced public sector procurement as an
opportunity to create increased competition among sup-
pliers. An advantage of this is that it would allow a
choice between multiple suppliers, who compete for
lower prices. To increase competition among suppliers,
numerous governments have also introduced web-based
procurement portals with varying degrees of publicly
available information. This approach to “pricing trans-
parency” ranges from publically available information on
suppliers who have won bids to procure products, to
purchase price information, to complete disclosure of
every stage of the procurement process (including re-
vealing the competing bids and the prices that they were
set at). Depending on the level of price transparency
within these procurement systems, governments have
realized different levels of cost savings.
There are many hypothesized benefits to increasing
transparency in the purchasing of medicines and medical
supplies. The increase in accurate information should
allow policy makers and procurement managers to bid
on fair prices, track prices over time, and more accur-
ately estimate budget requirements [16]. Additionally,
transparency in pricing can expose irregular price mark-
ups, it can assist in the avoidance of drug shortagesthrough accurately forecasting quantities of essential
supplies, it can decrease risk of theft or spoilage of sup-
plies, and the purchase of counterfeit drugs can be
avoided [14]. Theoretically, increasing price transparency
has the potential to increase accessibility to drugs – both
in terms of decreased prices and greater availability. It
can potentially act as a powerful incentive for producers
and suppliers to raise the quality and lower the price of
their goods. Ideally, it also helps reduce the likelihood of
corruption, thus affecting drug prices.
Brazil’s Approach to pricing transparency
In an effort to improve transparency and accountability
in the pharmaceutical system, in 1998 Brazil’s Federal
Government implemented, under the leadership of then
Minister of Health, Jose Serra, the Banco de Preços em
Saúde (BPS). The BPS was to be used as a transparency
measure to facilitate the centralization of pricing infor-
mation, and to decrease the high cost of medicines and
medical supplies [17, 18].
The BPS, initially known as the Data Bank of Hospital
Prices (Banco de Preços Praticados na Área Hospitalar,
BPPH), began as an Ordinance that made it mandatory
for all federally funded hospitals with 320 beds or more
to publish purchasing prices of medical supplies on the
Ministry website [19]. Today, it works as a free and open
online information system that records, stores, and
makes available the prices of medicines and health prod-
ucts purchased by public and private institutions regis-
tered in the system. The creation of the BPS is not
unique; as noted throughout this paper later, similar on-
line drug pricing portals are also available in the neigh-
bouring Mercosur countries [20, 21].
The objectives of the BPS are as follows: (1) to manage
market information of medicines and other health prod-
ucts, particularly information that relates to the supply
and demand of such goods; (2) to monitor the price
trends of prices of medicines and other health products;
(3) to increase access to buyers for suppliers; (4) to guide
public managers in decision making by allowing price
comparisons; and lastly, (5) to increase transparency in
the allocation of SUS resources by establishing social
control through the introduction of open online access
to the BPS [21]. The BPS discloses purchasing prices of
medicines that are paid for by public institutions at the
federal, state and municipal levels of government, as well
as of private and international institutions that have
been registered in the system (e.g. some NGOs, private
clinics/hospitals) [22]. While private and public institu-
tions provide purchasing information voluntarily, federal
public institutions are required to do so by law.
The BPS registry is publicly available online without
restrictions. The price bank generates excel reports with
the following variable headings: date of purchase; quantity;
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form of bidding; the country of origin of purchase; pur-
chase receipt number; number of bids; vendor name; and
manufacturers’ name and country. This information is
readily available for a wide range of medical products [22].
As of 2012, there were 948 registered institutions, with a
total of 15,180 purchases corresponding to 43,677 items
with a total of R18.2 billion [23].
Why look at São Paulo and Paraiba?
We sought to explore whether a transparency tool such
as the BPS would result in different price outcomes in
two states with very different socioeconomic conditions.
The rationale behind this came from our understanding
of the large negative impact that high drug prices has on
the poor and marginalized. As is noted, the burden of
spending on medicines is most significant for the poor-
est of Brazil’s population. We thought it necessary to
analyze pharmaceutical pricing changes resulting from
the BPS, a tool theorized to address inefficiencies within
procurement, in two states – Paraiba and São Paulo.
These states have starkly different socioeconomic condi-
tions, representing states on either end of the socioeco-
nomic spectrum. We therefore sought to see if the BPS
has had any impact on alleviating this and would con-
tribute to establishing equity among the population. In
our analyses the state of Paraiba represents the poorest
of Brazil’s population, and São Paulo the richest. Paraiba
has an average nominal monthly income per capita of
R$565 with 27.99 % of Paraiba’s households earning a
nominal monthly income equal to or less than the state
minimum wage [24]. São Paulo on the other hand has
an average nominal monthly income per capita that is
more than double that of Paraiba at R$1259 [21], with
only 6.36 % of São Paulo’s households earning a nominal
monthly income equal to or less than the state minimum
wage [24]. Moreover, in the state of Paraiba, the poorest
families (average monthly income of up to US$415) spend
a monthly average of 4.0 % (equivalent to US$12.96) of
their income on medicines, while the richest families (with
an average monthly income of more than US$5,187)
spend a monthly average of 1.7 % (equivalent to
US$97.54) of their income on medicines. In the state of
São Paulo, the poorest families (average monthly income
of up to US$415) spend a monthly average of 5.7 %
(equivalent to US$23.74) of their income on medicines,
while the richest families (average monthly income of
more than US$5,187) spend a monthly average of 2.9 %
(equivalent to US$187.08) of their income on medicines.
With such large differences between these states, we were
keen to examine if pricing transparency matters across
economic divides.
Several quantitative and qualitative studies have illus-
trated how the burden of corruption impacts the poormore heavily, given their limited ability to pay, resulting
in limited access to the health care system [25]. Certainly
within Brazil, it has been made clear that there is a
discrepancy in proportion of out-of-pocket spending
between rich and poor families within both states, this
may be a simply inefficiencies in the system or possibly
corruption. Without adequate tools that help ensure
good governance within pharmaceutical systems, any
funding allocated to treat health conditions may simply
be wasted and inequality between rich and poor in access
to health and pharmaceutical products will be aggravated
[26]. For these reasons, it is important to determine
whether the BPS is an adequate tool for decreasing drug
prices.
Alternative pharmaceutical procurement practices
To provide examples of alternative pharmaceutical prac-
tices and tools, we highlight examples from other Latin
American countries. In the early 2000s, MERCOSUR
Member States (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay)
and its associated countries, Bolivia and Chile, developed
and approved an Agreement entitled the “Drug Policy of
MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile”. The purpose of the
Policy is to seek to improve state action, particularly
with regard to four themes identified as key objectives
for the countries of the region in the area of medicines:
a) Expanding people’s access to drugs, considering the
needs of different social groups;
b) Ensuring the quality, safety and efficacy of the drugs
circulating in the region;
c) Promoting a culture of rational use of medicines;
d) Creating an environment of research and
development that supports better integration of the
countries in the technology sector. [27]
Since then, efforts to increase access to medicines
through the public sector have been seen across these
countries. Initiatives in Argentina, UCAMAE in
Uruguay, and in Chile show how governments are utiliz-
ing procurement systems and economies of scale to bar-
gain and negotiate drug purchases in a centralized
fashion. These efforts stem from a need to contain costs
and ensure broad access to essential medicines. A key
aspect to these programmes is the implementation of
various pricing transparency approaches within their
procurement systems. The following section will provide
a review of these programmes, with a particular focus on
the ways in which they vary in terms of intensity and
scope of pricing transparency.
Argentina
In 2001, Schargrodsky et al. analyzed the effects of the
mandatory report of purchasing prices paid for medicines
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August 1996 to December 1997. The government com-
piled the reported prices into a report, which was distrib-
uted back to the hospitals beginning in October of 1996.
The study found that drug prices significantly decreased a
month after the mandatory purchase price policy was im-
plemented, but the trend was not continued and prices
eventually began to increase over time [15]. The decrease
in drug prices observed by Schargrodsky et al. took place
before the report on drug prices was actually disseminated
back to the hospitals. This suggests that the observed de-
creases in drug prices were caused by the anticipation of
policy mandating the report of purchase prices, as well as
the “fear” of possible chances of detection and punishment
if prices were well beyond the average. Savedoff argues
that merely publishing price information was not enough
to improve efficiency [28]. In the absence of consequences
procurement officers became accustomed to the process
of reporting and the lack of further investigation into any
poor performance.
In the midst of the economic crisis of 2001–2002, the
government of Argentina decided to implement the na-
tional REMEDIAR program with the aim of providing
free medicines to in-patients, low-income patients, chil-
dren under 5 years of age, pregnant women, and elderly
adults. Today, this program effectively provides coverage
for all medicines on the Essential Medicines List for 16
million people across the country [29]. In addition,
Argentina’s public sector procurement also consists of
provincial and municipal programs. Although Argentina
has no legal or regulatory provisions that dictate the pri-
cing of medicines, the Ministry of Health produces a
monthly Average Drug Price Index (IPPM) as well as an
index of weighted prices based on the REMEDIAR Pro-
gram [30]. Public sector tender bids recently became
publicly available, with the REMEDIAR program updat-
ing its webpage to publicly publish bids and awards [31].
This move to increase the scope of pricing transparency
can certainly be attributed to the country’s past lessons
in the inefficiencies of merely publishing purchase prices
to help ensure competitive drug prices, as highlighted in
Schargrodsky et al’s 2001 study [15].
Bolivia
Despite the existence of a National Essential Medicines
Program (Programa de Medicamentos Esenciales de
Bolivia, PNMEBOL), the Bolivian Government estimates
that nearly 50 % of the population still experiences sig-
nificant economic, cultural, and geographic barriers to
accessing drugs [32]. Corruption in the pharmaceuticals
chain has undercut much of the government’s efforts to
improve access to medicines. Ongoing drug smuggling
activity as well as counterfeit and adulterated drugs en-
tering the market have undermined the aims of thePNMEBOL [32]. In recognition of these issues, Bolivia
recently instituted a National Drug Policy. The policy
rests on two main pillars: el Sistema Nacional de Vigi-
lancia y Control de Medicamentos (National System for
Monitoring and Medicine Control), and Sistema Nacio-
nal Unico de Suministro (Unified National Supply Sys-
tem). The National System for Monitoring and Control
of Drugs is upheld by the country’s Medicines Act and
its accompanying regulations. It allows the government
to regulate the importing, production, distribution, sale,
advertisement, and surveillance of drugs in order to pro-
tect patients against the potential hazards of fraudulent
activity in the pharmaceutical supply and distribution
chain.
The National Drug Policy is also focused on strength-
ening the Central de Abastecimiento y Suministros
(CEASS, Center of Procurement and Supply) in order to
ensure the availability of essential medicines at reason-
able costs for the country’s network of public health insti-
tutions. It has established standards for the qualification
of suppliers, best practices for the procurement of drugs
through state-run institutions, as well as technical and
quality requirements for the various types of procurement
contracts. Bolivia’s Sistema de Contrataciones Estatales
also allows for a competitive acquisition strategy to pro-
cure essential medicines of high quality, safety and effi-
ciency. Overall, Bolivia has taken the necessary steps to
optimize the use of government financial resources for
purchasing pharmaceuticals, while also keeping in high
consideration the health needs of the population.
Chile
Public procurement in Chile is comprehensively governed
both by the 2003 Law on Procurement and complemen-
tary regulations that guide the public procurement
process. The implementation of these governing tools led
to the formation of the Dirección de Compras y Contrata-
ción Pública (Public Procurement and Contract Direction)
and its accompanying internet portal ChileCompra in
2010 [33, 34]. This e-procurement system (www.mercado-
publico.cl) allows procurement processes to be centralized
and digitized, negotiating multi-year agreements with sup-
pliers for select products [35, 36].
For the specific procurement of drugs and medical de-
vices, CENABAST (Central Nacional de Abastecimiento)
is the single buying agency for the Chilean Ministry of
Health. CENABAST is responsible for the procurement
and distribution of essential medicines for Chile’s hospi-
tals. To procure generic drugs, CENABAST aggregates
hospitals’ demand, and releases calls for proposals through
the ChileCompra e-marketplace. Awarded products are
set at a fixed price for 6 months, until the process is re-
peated again (twice yearly). Non-generic drugs and vac-
cines are purchased by the Ministry of Health through
Table 1 The 19 medicines studied and analyzed from the
Banco de Preços em Saúde
Drug Dosage (mg) Class
Aciclovir 200 Antiviral
Amoxicillin 500 Antibiotic
Aspirin 100 Antithrombotic agent
Atenolol 50 Antihypertensive (β-blocker)











Omeprazol 20 Drug for acid related disorder
(proton pump inhibitor)
Paracétamol 500 Analgesic
Propranolol 40 Antihypertensive (βntihypert)
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delivery structure. In 2010, purchases made through
CENABAST made up 36.6 % of total drug purchases in
Chile [37].
Paraguay
In 2009 Paraguay’s Ministry of Health developed an Es-
sential Drugs List and an accompanying integrated logis-
tic system for medicines and supplies. The Sistema de
Información y Control de Inventario Automatizado
(SICIAP, Automated Information and Inventory Control
System) allows health officials to track medicines
through the country’s supply chain of warehouses, hospi-
tals and clinics. It is estimated that the new system will
save approximately US$6.2 million each year through its
ability to oversee potential shortages, avoid waste, and
control proper storage and use of medicines [38].
Uruguay
In 2005, Uruguay implemented a National Integrated
Health System, within which a centralized public pro-
curement unit for the purchase of medicines (UCAMAE,
http://uca.mef.gub.uy) was created [39]. Public hospital
pharmacies make their purchases through UCAMAE.
According to Lalanne (2004), 55 % of the purchases
through UCAMAE were done on behalf of the public
health system, 19 % were for public hospitals, 36 % for
public health insurance entities, and 45 % for drug stores
and other private distribution channels [40]. This repre-
sents a significant opportunity to centralize purchases
and drive down public spending on medicines.
The prior examples illuminate how efforts to improve
transparency in pricing and procurement are widespread
throughout Latin America. It is therefore compelling to
conduct an investigation of the impact of price transpar-
ency over time in order to help governments understand
what transparency practices can ensure in terms of posi-




Access to the Banco de Preços em Saúde was obtained
by registering to the BPS public database online
(bps.saude.gov.br). Once access was acquired, a general
report (Relatório geral BPS e SIASG) of BPS and SIASG
data was created for 25 drugs. These 25 drugs were se-
lected because they constitute widely utilized therapeu-
tics on Brazil’s Relação Nacional de Medicamentos
Essenciais (RENAME), the country’s national EML.
These drugs are provided to citizens at no-cost through
SUS [41], and are required to be available at all times in
adequate amounts and dosages, with assured quality andadequate information, and at a price an individual and
the health system can afford [42].
The reports were created by selecting Equipamentos e
artigos para uso medico, dentario under Grupo CAT-
MAT, Drogas e medicamentos under Classe CATMAT,
the drug name under Descrição Item and the dates (dd/
mm/yy) 01/01/2002 to 07/05/2013 under Data de Com-
pra. Twenty-five general reports were created for 25
drugs. The 25 drugs were matched against specific cri-
teria: a) data is available for an 8 year span (2005–2013),
b) drug is listed on the 2012 RENAME, and c) drug is a
widely utilized in its class of therapeutics. 6 drugs did
not meet the criteria, and the 19 drugs that were chosen
were as follows: acyclovir, amoxicillin, aspirin, atenolol,
captopril, diazepam, dipyrone, enalapril, fluoxetine, fur-
osemide, glibenclamide, hydrochlorothiazide, metformin,
omeprazole, paracetamol, propanalol, ranitidine, trama-
dol, and warfarin (Table 1). Data from the general re-
ports were extracted to show data (institution, date
purchased, price paid ($R), quantity and supplier) from
the states of São Paulo and Paraiba for each of the 19
drugs. The prices that are referred to are those at the
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and the suppliers.Statistical analysis
Data were described using means and standard devia-
tions over all transactions, for each drug and state separ-
ately. To explore the linear time trend of each of the
drugs that met the selection criteria, separate regression
models were fitted for each drug, resulting in a total of
19 models. To accommodate for expected heterogeneity
in the data, the models controlled for the state variable
as well as the interaction between state and time. The
models also controlled for procurement quantities and
the effect they have on the unit price. Secondary analysis
was also carried out to account for the impact that insti-
tutions and suppliers may have upon the unit price.
Adjusting for these predictor variables (procurement
quantities, supplier, purchasing institution) was import-
ant to determine the sole effect that time has had on
unit prices. A total of 2 x 19 = 38 models were estimated
to explore the overall effect of time on changes in unit
price. All statistical analyses were performed using the R
statistical software, while the linear mixed effects models
were fitted using the lme4 R package [43].a) Primary analysis
For each pairing of drug and state, a linear regression
model was estimated using the log of unit price as the
dependent variable and time as the primary linear pre-
dictor (adjusted also for the log of the quantity within
each transaction as unit prices appeared to be inversely
proportional to purchase quantities in each transaction).
The primary objective of this regression model was the
investigation of any linear time trend of each drug’s unit
price, therefore no other functional forms of the time
variable were explored. Unit prices were also adjusted
for inflation at each time point by dividing by a factor
representing the inflation at the time point of the earliest
transaction involving the specific drug. The inflation fac-
tor was calculated using the IPA-OG Produtos Farma-
cêuticos index (available from www.ipeadata.gov.br),
which is a wholesale price index for pharmaceutical
products. The index is available only up to the end of
year 2007. We therefore needed to forecast its values for
the remaining time horizon the drug transactions data
covered (up the end of 2013). We used an ARIMA
model for the forecasting selected based on the Akaike
Information Criterion according to the auto.arima func-
tion in the forecast R package [44].
The quantity of drugs in each procurement is known
to have a significant impact on the outcome variable (i.e.
the effect of economies of scale), therefore the model
controlled for this effect. If upijk, qijk and tijk, representthe unit price, quantity and time for transaction i, for
supplier j and institution k, the model has the form:
log upijk
 
¼ aþ β1  tijk þ β2  log qijk
 
þ β3
 stateijk þ β4  stateijk  tijk
 þ εijk ;
where the error εijk is normally distributed with mean 0,
and where α, β1, β2, β3, β4 represent the intercept and
the coefficients for time, logged quantity, state and inter-
action between state and time respectively. Using Sao
Paulo as the reference level for the state variable, the co-
efficient β1 represents the effect of time to the (deflated)
logged unit price for the state of Sao Paolo, while the
quantity β1 + β4 represented the time effect for the Para-
iba state. Equivalently, the quantity exp(β1) is the pro-
portional change of the geometric mean of the deflated
price unit over time for the state of Sao Paolo, while
exp(β1 + β4) represents the same time trend for the state
of Paraiba. For either of these quantities values above 1
indicate an increasing trend over time, while decreasing
trend corresponds to values below 1.
Non-stationarity problems were investigated with the
use of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, using the
adf.test function from the tseries R package [45].
Secondary analysis
A secondary analysis of the data was carried out to account
for potential clustering structures due to transactions in-
volving the same supplier or the same institution. It was
important to control for the effects of any given supplier
and institution/purchaser as these may be sources of cor-
ruption within a procurement transaction. Linear mixed ef-
fects models were estimated, with the following form:
log upijk
 
¼ a1j þ a2k þ β1  tijk þ β2  log qijk
 
þ β3  stateijk þ β4  stateijk  tijk
 
þ εijk ;
where the error εijk and crossed random effects for sup-
plier and institution α1j and α2k are all normally distrib-
uted and pairwise independent. Time trends are
represented in a fashion similar to the primary analysis.
Results
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of pro-
curement quantities and (inflation adjusted) unit price
over the number of transactions, for all 19 drugs and
two states. Detailed descriptive statistics are included in
the Additional files 1 and 2: Tables S1 and S2.
The results from the regression model and the mixed
effects model are shown on Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
The confidence intervals of the time trends for Sao Paolo
and Paraiba were estimated using Bootstrap [46]. Time
trends were considered as statistically significant if the
Table 2 Means and standard deviations for procurement quantity and deflated unit price for all drugs in Paraiba and Sao Paulo
Drugs Paraiba Sao Paulo
Number of transactions Quantity Unit price Number of transactions Quantity Unit Price
warfarin 5 25 835.2 (837.92) 0.2548 (0.1825) 15 48842 (107277.37) 0.2724 (0.1639)
tramadol 50 36 3133.33 (4026.41) 0.5489 (0.7541) 19 8336.68 (29622.02) 0.9358 (1.2744)
ranitidine 150 41 7701.95 (8417.15) 0.1377 (0.3329) 64 1865.13 (9828.25) 0.6128 (1.4629)
propranolol 40 30 2369.8 (2309.97) 0.0630 (0.1674) 27 2018.81 (7632.9) 0.1070 (01042)
paracetamol 500 53 3450.43 (6303.88) 3.0024 (7.8183) 117 10697.24 (74257.98) 7.6817 (26.9272)
omeprazol 20 22 4316.91 (6573.12) 0.5314 (0.9903) 89 20094.3 (123487.28) 0.6563 (1.4910)
metformin 850 24 1180 (1012.03) 0.0887 (0.1116) 13 139276.92 (498986.65) 0.1061 (0.0802)
hydrochlorothiazide 25 18 2711.11 (2079.56) 0.2047 (0.7577) 12 669.25 (1684.59) 0.69833 (2.1274)
glibenclamide 5 27 1038.89 (805.28) 0.0425 (0.0631) 14 434.29 (521.31) 0.1056 (0.1267)
furosemide 40 48 3348.79 (5264.95) 0.6770 (1.3493) 36 1360.58 (5966.58) 0.5028 (0.6276)
fluoxetin 20 18 1316.67 (1585.15) 0.4489 (1.0811) 18 31890 (117633.3) 0.2202 (0.2812)
enalapril 10 22 1956.82 (3451.2) 0.0822 (0.1673) 20 905 (722.73) 0.9847 (2.5833)
dipyrone 500 55 1799.49 (3501.41) 0.5588 (1.8323) 214 4449.22 (38249.86) 0.9847 (2.5833)
aspirin 100 36 3567.58 (4163.36) 0.03085 (1.2562) 41 89952.9 (561954.34) 1.1856 (3.4496)
amoxicillin 500 51 5503.88 (31561.04) 4.0855 (6.7088) 156 1282.76 (2106.23) 2.5683 (4.6342)
aciclovir 200 30 2513.33 (3556.39) 0.1756 (0.3487) 29 9641.9 (30915.89) 0.7068 (1.9487)
diazepam 5 31 1464.19 (1333.9) 0.0281 (0.0170) 23 311.26 (489.03) 0.1424 (0.2413)
captopril 12,5 34 7159.74 (9238.61) 2.0732 (6.3786) 14 362.29 (773.69) 2.2564 (5.2408)













Table 3 Regression Results for Paraiba (PB) and Sao Paulo (SP), showing time trend estimates and 95 % confidence intervals,
adjusted R2 and p-value from the F test
Drug Sample size Time trend estimate PB Time trend estimate SP Adj R2 P-value
Aciclovir 200 59 0.878 (0.795, 0.981) 0.931 (0.783, 1.131) 0.373 <0.0001
Amoxicillin 500 207 1.100 (0.986, 1.268) 0.981 (0.916, 1.058) 0.695 <0.0001
Aspirin 100 77 1.032 (0.919, 1.243) 1.045 (0.925, 1.246) 0.644 <0.0001
Atenolol 50 31 0.939 (0.762, 1.076) 0.966 (0.694, 1.553) 0.09 0.171
Captopril 12,5 48 1.218 (0.998, 1.466) 1.053 (0.703, 1.541) 0.65 <0.0001
Diazepam 5 54 1.059 (0.986, 1.186) 0.999 (0.858, 1.178) 0.338 <0.0001
Dipyrone 500 269 1.070 (0.944, 1.260) 0.993 (0.936, 1.052) 0.481 <0.0001
Enalapril 10 42 1.050 (0.857, 1.388) 1.286 (0.950, 1.567) 0.227 0.008
Fluoxetin 20 36 0.931 (0.523, 1.477) 1.098 (0.826, 1.585) 0.085 0.151
Furosemide 40 84 1.049 (0.921, 1.167) 0.961 (0.789, 1.140) 0.575 <0.0001
Glibenclamide 5 41 1.074 (0.938, 1.235) 1.201 (0.851, 2.133) 0.22 0.011
Hydrochlorothiazide 25 30 1.237 (0.987, 2.255) 0.856 (0.489, 1.174) 0.371 0.003
Metformin 850 37 0.856 (0.777, 0.928) 0.939 (0.771, 1.037) 0.242 0.011
Omeprazol 20 111 0.862 (0.692, 1.046) 0.967 (0.860, 1.082) 0.368 <0.0001
Paracetamol 500 170 1.146 (1.031, 1.268) 1.074 (0.962, 1.190) 0.735 <0.0001
Propranolol 40 57 1.022 (0.860, 1.344) 1.024 (0.826, 1.295) 0.2 0.003
Ranitidine 150 105 1.034 (0.957, 1.115) 1.127 (1.021, 1.246) 0.478 <0.0001
Tramadol 50 55 0.761 (0.681, 0.949) 1.067 (0.847, 1.466) 0.46 <0.0001
Warfarin 5 40 0.837 (0.759, 0.975) 1.035 (0.899, 1.218) 0.626 <0.0001
Table 4 Mixed effects model results for paraiba and sao paulo.





Aciclovir 200 0.904 (0.845, 0.971) 1.055 (0.925, 1.213)
Amoxicillin 500 1.035 (0.926, 1.166) 1.003 (0.934, 1.074)
Aspirin 100 1.018 (0.871, 1.163) 1.021 (0.864, 1.199)
Atenolol 50 0.897 (0.787, 1.032) 1.000 (0.775, 1.281)
Captopril 12,5 1.258 (1.024, 1.554) 1.085 (0.736, 1.505)
Diazepam 5 1.031 (0.975, 1.097) 1.025 (0.948, 1.111)
Dipyrone 500 1.094 (0.966, 1.232) 0.977 (0.927, 1.033)
Enalapril 10 1.074 (0.942, 1.241) 1.239 (1.071, 1.437)
Fluoxetin 20 0.924 (0.688, 1.218) 1.095 (0.783, 1.467)
Furosemide 40 1.084 (0.956, 1.220) 0.939 (0.811, 1.079)
Glibenclamide 5 1.087 (0.946, 1.232) 1.064 (0.767, 1.454)
Hydrochlorothiazide 25 0.981 (0.895, 1.066) 1.140 (0.931, 1.385)
Metformin 850 0.860 (0.779, 0.944) 0.943 (0.820, 1.099)
Omeprazol 20 0.813 (0.656, 0.987) 1.004 (0.897, 1.132)
Paracetamol 500 1.151 (1.017, 1.296) 1.039 (0.943, 1.144)
Propranolol 40 1.000 (0.889, 1.115) 0.983 (0.840, 1.156)
Ranitidine 150 1.022 (0.934, 1.127) 1.053 (0.955, 1.161)
Tramadol 50 0.713 (0.615, 0.819) 0.922 (0.770, 1.106)
Warfarin 5 0.833 (0.772, 0.902) 1.002 (0.875, 1.152)
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Complete results from both types of models, including
point estimates and confidence intervals for all the coeffi-
cients can be found in the additional files (see Additional
files 3 and 4: Tables S3 and S4).
a) Results from the primary analysis
The simple linear regression models revealed that in Para-
iba the unit price of 5 of the 19 medicines investigated
changed significantly with time. The unit price of four of
those (Aciclovir, Metformin, Tramadol and Warfarin) de-
creased over time, while the unit price of Paracetamol in-
creased over time. In São Paulo, no drug showed a
significantly decreasing time trend, and the unit price of
only Ranitidine showed a significant increasing trend.
Evidence of stationarity was found from the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test.
b) Results from the secondary analysis
The more complex mixed effects model was used as sec-
ondary analysis and revealed that 8 out of the 19 medi-
cines investigated changed significantly with time. Seven
of the medicines with significant time trends were in
Paraiba, with two of them showing an increasing trend
(Captopril, Paracetamol) and five showing a decreasing
Kohler et al. Globalization and Health  (2015) 11:34 Page 10 of 13trend (Aciclovir, Metformin, Omeprazol, Tramadol, and
Warfarin). In the state of São Paulo only one medicine
(Enalapril) showed a significant time trend, where its
unit price increased over time.Discussion
What does the database show with regards to changes in
drug prices over time?
The findings from our analysis suggest that there is no
pattern of consistent decreases of prices during the five-
year period for which the prices were analyzed. The
medicines that were reviewed in the analysis represented
widely used and prescribed medicines, so the results are
suggestive of the fact that the existence of the BPS tool
has not lead to consistent purchase price decreases for
medicines in Paraiba and São Paulo.What does the database show with regards to
comparative drug pricing between two socioeconomically
different Brazilian states?
The results of the simple linear time-trend regression
analysis revealed that the unit price of only 5 out of the
19 medicines either significantly increased or signifi-
cantly decreased every year in the state of Paraiba. Con-
versely, this analysis revealed a significant change over
time of the unit price of only one medicine in the state
of São Paulo. The results from the more complex mixed
effects model indicated that 8 drugs are significantly
changing over time, seven in the state of Paraiba and
only one in the state of São Paulo. Both of these analyses
revealed a similar medicine price pattern for Paraiba
against very limited evidence for São Paulo.
Potential explanations for the observed difference in
results between the two states cannot be explained
through policies and regulations that regulate drug
prices in Brazil. While each Brazilian state is responsible
for the purchasing and procurement of medicines, as
well as for the allocation of funds for the purchase of
medicines, the Federal Government regulates price and
payment practices in each state. All states are also under
surveillance of the Regulation Chamber of Drug Market
(CMED, Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medica-
mentos) [47], which regulates drug prices in the pharma-
ceutical industry [48]. We were unable to find any
difference in drug policies between São Paulo and Para-
iba that would have an effect on the observed differences
in price patterns between the two states. However, there
are other factors that were not considered during ana-
lysis, such as the local supply conditions of each state,
inefficiencies in their health systems, embezzlement and
fraud, as well as a lack of respect for laws that regulate
drug prices that may explain the observed differences in
results between Paraiba and São Paulo.What does this examination say about the BPS’ ability to
work as a transparency measure to decrease drug prices?
The results from our two analyses showed evidence of
unit price decrease over time for 5 out of the 19 drugs,
all in the state of Paraiba, and none in the state of São
Paulo. Our analysis therefore suggest that transparency
portals such as the BPS may not be an effective tool for
decreasing drug prices in those two states, particularly
in São Paulo, and suggestively in Brazil as a whole. If we
refer back to Schargrodsky et al.’s study [15] that ana-
lyzed a similar transparency measure for drug prices in
Argentina, our findings are similar. Both studies suggests
that any observed decrease in drug prices upon the ini-
tial implementation of the policy may have been caused
by the anticipation of possible chances of detection and
punishment if prices were well beyond the average. One
major failing of the Argentinian initiative, which may
also be the same for the BPS tool, was the lack of action
from the government following the results of the survey.
Evidently, inefficiencies and corrupt practices continued,
which ultimately led to an eventual increase in drug
prices. In Brazil, this is also indicative of the lack of
regulation and action on the part of the Regulation
Chamber of Drug Market (CMED) which is responsible
for regulating drug prices in the pharmaceutical indus-
try. It is clear that the BPS does not fully capture the
theorized benefits of pricing transparency, and alone is
not effective at driving down purchasing prices.
Limitations
The most important limitation within our study is the
sample size (number of purchase reports) for each drug
that was used to analyze drug prices, for which some
medicine pairings are not comparable in quantity. A lar-
ger sample size may have revealed more significant in-
creases or decreases in medicine price in either São
Paulo or Paraiba. Moreover, we do not have similar com-
parable purchase data without the presence of the portal,
so we cannot know if the changes in unit price over time
are due to the BPS or if they would have happened with-
out this transparency tool.
Another limitation in our data lies in the existence of
the Ministry of Health’s Popular Pharmacy Program,
which was launched in 2004, during the study period.
With this Program, citizens can purchase medicines on
Brazil’s RENAME at a 90 % discount, which is subsidized
by the government [49].The Ministry of Health supplies
the program by manufacturing the medicines through a
national public foundation [50]. Since the majority of
the selected medicines in this study were also available
for purchase at a discounted rate through the Popular
Pharmacy Program [51] this measure may have an effect
on drug prices based on the supply and demand present
in the market. Perhaps future studies can investigate the
Kohler et al. Globalization and Health  (2015) 11:34 Page 11 of 13medicines not present on the Popular Pharmacy list to
limit external factors that could affect price. The type of
medicine purchased by the institutions is another limita-
tion because there are three types of medicines in the
Brazilian market: originator brand, generic and similar
[11]. The difference between a similar and generic drug
is that the generic drug is bioequivalent to the original
drug and has proven to have the same efficacy, safety
and quality, whereas the similar drug is a copy of the ref-
erence, but there is no proof of bioequivalence [10]. Al-
though the prices drawn from the BPS were those of
generics, (which are known to be more expensive than
similars), the BPS does not differentiate between generic
and similar drugs, and thus this could affect the results
of the regression model.
Finally, the BPS does not differentiate between the
types of drug suppliers, which makes it difficult to con-
clude to what extent this affects our analysis. The type
of supplier (manufacturer, distributer, or wholesaler, and
local or international) has a direct effect on medicine
price through different markups and it is important to
take this information into consideration when conduct-
ing an analysis of price trends over time. Our data iden-
tified 82 % of suppliers to be wholesale distributers, but
whether they were foreign-sourced or local was unclear.
Conclusion
We found a unique interplay of the effects that transpar-
ency has had on restraining drug prices. Even after con-
trolling for procurement quantities (economies of scale),
supplier and institution/purchaser (potential sources of
corruption), our analysis found that there is no consist-
ent decrease in prices across all medicine groups. While
the BPS has increased access to information on drug
purchasing in Brazil, it has not shown to lead to consist-
ent reductions in drug purchase prices for some of the
most widely used medicines within a five-year time span.
This is indicative of a limited model for addressing the
challenges in pharmaceutical procurement. It is clear
that Brazil’s BPS tool alone is a necessary but insufficient
tool to address the risks of corruption, nor does it pro-
vide enough incentive to pharmaceutical suppliers to
compete with lower prices.
Even though pricing transparency should allow for a de-
crease in prices, evidence reveals that additional measures
must be taken to warrant such optimal price patterns.
Comparison to other Mercosur countries with pricing
transparency initiatives has shown that countries with
additional measures embedded within transparency tools
(such as competitive tendering) can effectively reduce
prices. Of note are the countries with pricing transparency
tools similar to Brazil (e.g. Argentina) that had not shown
the same successes in lowering prices until they had insti-
tuted additional transparency measures and incentives[15, 27, 31]. Transparency measures such as BPS can be
improved considerably if they include incentives and re-
wards for “good” behaviours and penalties for “bad” be-
haviours, as well as further attempts to increase price
transparency and competition among suppliers.
Opportunities for further research
Given the limitations of our study (such as the small
number of drugs analyzed and the fact that our research
was conducted in only 2 out of 27 Brazilian states)
greater analysis that accounts for these and other factors
should be explored in order to have more conclusive
and robust results. Further research is needed to deeply
analyse the extent to which the BPS has fulfilled its man-
dated objectives that have an effect on drug prices. Fur-
ther exploration is needed in terms of understanding
BPS’s effectiveness in managing market information of
medicines and other health products, as well as the de-
gree to which excluding non-federal institutions in the
mandatory reporting of purchasing information affects
the market information available in the BPS. Moreover,
it is important to analyse the degree to which the BPS is
used as a guideline for drug purchases throughout
Brazil, particularly in low-resource settings where Inter-
net might not be available. It may be illuminating to ex-
plore the positive and negative consequences of creating
an institution solely dedicated to monitoring drug price
trends and following up when irregularities are found
that may cause unexcused price increases. These factors
may not only conclude the extent to which the BPS
helps decrease drug prices in Brazil, but may also help
formulate recommendations for improving its success
and to help improve better access to medicines through-
out Brazil.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Paraiba Descriptive Statistical Analysis. This table
provides the descriptive statistical analysis for the State of Paraiba.
Additional file 2: Sao Paulo Descriptive Statistical Analysis. This
table provides the descriptive statistical analysis for the State of Sao
Paulo.
Additional file 3: Linear Regression Model Results. This table
provides the detailed results of the linear regression model analysis.
Additional file 4: Mixed Effects Model Results. This table provides the
detailed results of the mixed effects model analysis.
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